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Abstract: Ethics is understood as the worthiness of the rights and 
needs for accounting information of contending groups in society. 
Company law is viewed as a means by which users of financial state-
ments rights and needs have been redressed, and which users have 
relatively less important claims for information. The moral idealism 
of a true and fair view is being converted into impersonal disclosure 
laws which serve to provide, in the main, for the needs of sharehold-
ers. 
INTRODUCTION 
The theme of this paper is the role of mandatory public 
disclosure rules in removing the superior information of the 
issuers of financial statements (accounters). Specifically, com-
pany law is viewed as a means by which the users of financial 
statements (accountees') rights to know have been redressed.1 A 
diverse and expanded set of accountees are now pressing their 
rights to know. Today the list includes shareholders, creditors, 
The author acknowledges the contribution made to the research by the 
Honorary Visiting Scholar Program at Regent College and the facilities provided 
by the College, in Vancouver, B.C., Canada, where he spent his sabbatical leave 
in 1989. The author also thanks his former university, the University of 
Auckland for granting the sabbatical. 
1Lev [January, 1988] argues that inequity in capital markets leads to adverse 
transaction costs, thin markets, low liquidity and in general decreased gains 
from trade. Lev contends that such adverse consequences can be mitigated by a 
public policy mandating the disclosure of financial information in order to re-
duce information asymmetries. This paper considers the needs of other users as 
well as capital market participants by engaging in ethical reflection on the 
growth in disclosure laws. 
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labor unions, government, consumers, local neighborhoods and 
the public in general [Accounting Standards Steering Commit-
tee, 1975]. The necessity for ordering the needs of these 
accountees according to perceptions of relative importance 
needs to be addressed. These interpersonal comparisons are 
what Devine calls "ethics" [1985, Vol III, p. 50, see also Beaver 
and Demski, 1974, p. 184; May and Sundem, 1976; American 
Accounting Association, 1977, p. 24; Ansari and McDonough, 
1980, p. 139]. Devine argues that it is accountants' responsibility 
to be the "screening agents for weighing and coordinating inter-
personal needs and conflicts" [p. 50]. 
In terms of the accountability relationship, the accountant 
and auditor come between the accounter and the accountees to 
"assure a smooth flow of the required information" [Ijiri, Sum-
mer 1983, p. 76]. The duty of the accountant and auditor, as 
embodied in the inherited structures of accountability, is to an 
ideal; namely, to provide "a true and fair view" [Companies Act 
of 1981, s. 149]2 of the information flow. The problem, however, 
is that the accountant's duty to the ideal of truth and fairness 
may not be to the accounter's advantage [Westra, April 1986]. 
Historically, the personal moral idealism of truth and fairness 
has been insufficient to check the egoistic impulses of powerful 
companies.3 Hence, there has been a significant acceleration in 
minimum disclosure laws throughout the present century. The 
objective of this paper is to describe the struggle for the recogni-
tion of accountees' rights to know, and whose rights are rela-
tively more important. 
Plan of Study 
The plan is to examine company law as a dimension that 
has contributed to (or repressed) accountees' rights to know. 
Successive Companies Acts form part of the discourse of truth 
and fairness. Indeed, as Carr puts it, "the process by which spe-
cific historical content is given to abstract moral conceptions is 
a historical process" [1962, p. 76]. 
2J. G. Chastney [1975] sets out the changing configuration of ideals embod-
ied in successive Companies Acts and discusses the meaning of the various 
terms which have been used. 
3Cf. W. R. Kennedy's "The Auditor's Song". "I am the very model of a mod-
ern business auditor. I represent the quest for truth no corporation can deter. I 
poke my nose in every book and pose my questions quizzical" [1983, p. 22]. 
2
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This historical process can also be seen to be shaped within 
relations of power [Gordon, 1980]. Powerful industrialists and 
professional and trade associations made representations to 
Company Law Amendment Committees which preceded the 
passage of the Companies Acts during the period covered by 
this study. Hence, it is pertinent to raise the question of the 
extent to which disclosure laws may be sustaining and legiti-
mizing powerful economic and political groups, while disen-
franchising the rights to know of others [Cooper, 1980, p. 164; 
Cooper and Sherer, 1984, p. 225; Willmott, 1986, p. 561; Rich-
ardson, 1987, p. 351]. 
The identification and ordering of accountees has been gen-
erated in an inductive manner using primary and secondary 
source materials. Primary source documents include successive 
British Companies Acts along with the Company Law Amend-
ment Committees that immediately preceded the passage of the 
legislation.4 These sources constitute the principal evidential 
data for weighing the relative importance of the accountees. 
Secondary sources consulted included relevant articles from the 
periodical literature in accounting.5 
Time Period 
The minimum disclosure philosophy was first introduced in 
the Companies Act of 1907, but was not significantly developed 
until the Companies Act of 1929. A Company Law Amendment 
Committee was appointed in 1925 to undertake a full review of 
the working of the Companies Act then in force. The Committee 
reported in 1926, and its report formed the basis for the reforms 
of the Companies Acts 1928/29. The accounter's right to privacy 
received little opposition prior to this date. It has only been over 
the last half century that there has been a gradual evolution 
towards disclosure. Since the Act of 1929, there have been three 
major enactments in 1947, 1967 and 1981 which have further 
developed the theme of minimum disclosure. The Act of 1981, 
however, was not preceded by a Company Law Amendment 
Committee. It was driven by the harmonizing provisions of the 
4Excerpts from these Acts and Reports along with some of the evidence 
before the Committees has been brought together very helpfully in two volumes 
by Edwards [1980]. Extensive use was made of this material. 
5Especially helpful in this regard was the collection by Lee and Parker 
[1979]. 
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4th EC Directive on company law. Hence, the 1981 Act has been 
omitted from consideration. Moreover, 1970 saw the advent of 
the accounting standards setting program developed by the Brit-
ish accounting profession and thus marked the end of an era in 
which major reliance was placed on companies' legislation in 
raising the standards of company financial reporting and disclo-
sure. 
The rest of the paper is organized along chronological lines. 
A section is devoted to each of the major revisions of company 
law, which took place in 1928/29, 1947/48 and 1967. The con-
cluding section offers an interpretation of the data used in the 
study and emphasizes the relevance of the findings to contem-
porary education, policy and research issues. 
THE CULT OF PRIVACY 
The Growing Obscurity of Financial Reports 
Edwards [1979, p. 278] reports that in the years up to 1925 
accounting information was becoming less informative. Further 
support for this view comes from Kitchen [1979, p. 98] and 
Edey [1979, pp. 226-7]. Both Edwards [1979, pp. 278-9], and 
Kitchen [1979, p. 118] point out that secrecy in financial report-
ing may well have reflected the difficult conditions facing direc-
tors in the 1920s. Kitchen notes that "to many of them, to in-
crease disclosure seemed tantamount to inviting more criticism 
— at the least more questions, and many had had their fill of 
inquiries." Edwards observes that an explanation of the obscure 
reporting practices of some managers lay in their belief that the 
decline in demand for their products was of a temporary char-
acter and would revive with the imminent up-turn in the trading 
cycle [p. 279]. 
In these particular circumstances, the accounters' moral po-
sition may have been act-utilitarian;6 namely, that "it can never 
be right to act on the rule of telling the truth if we have good 
independent grounds for thinking that it would be for the great-
est general good not to tell the truth" [Frankena, 1963, p. 30]. 
6"Act-utilitarians hold that in general, or at least where it is practicable, one 
is to tell what is right or obligatory by appealing directly to the principle of 
utility or, in other words, by trying to see which of the actions open to him will 
or is likely to produce the greatest balance of good over evil in the universe" 
[Frankena, 1963, p. 30]. 
4
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Public disclosure of poor performance may precipitate the fail-
ure of the company with consequent loss to the investing public 
and the workforce. 
Greene Committee 
The Greene Committee on Company Law Amendment, 
which sat in 1925, circulated among some 44 individuals and 
institutions, including the Co-operative Congress and the Trades 
Union Congress, for their views on the existing state of com-
pany law. Edwards [1980, p. xvi] reports that 39 submissions 
were made to the Committee including both written and oral 
evidence from the Co-operative Congress, but no submission 
was received from the Trades Union Congress. Accountancy 
bodies made representations to the Greene Committee for the 
first time in the long history of company reform (dating back to 
1867). 
At the time, accepted conventions "left a fairly wide area of 
accounting discretion to company management and auditors" 
[Yamey, 1979, p. 237]. In practice, the exercise of accounting 
discretion.... was conditioned in general by an approved bias 
towards conservatism' " [p. 237]. But, as Yamey observes, the 
creation of secret reserves "went well beyond the caution of this 
ordinary conservatism" [p. 237]. Edwards [1979, p. 280] notes 
that overall secret reserves received approval from those wit-
nesses who gave evidence. Mr. F. Whinney felt that shareholders 
might be entitled to know of their existence although not the 
details relating to them [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 101]. Both 
the Law Society [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 102] and the Insti-
tute of Chartered Accountants [Edwards, 1980 Vol. II, p. 120] 
took the view that a balance sheet prepared to give full protec-
tion to creditors would give away information to competitors. 
The giving of an "externality" to competitors is a theme which 
runs throughout the period reviewed here. Both institutions 
contended that the remedy for shareholders was to ask ques-
tions at the annual meeting. As Garnsey [1922] observed, 
"shareholders as a rule are quick to appreciate the dangers at-
tending a too full statement of the affairs of their company and 
rely to an almost unlimited extent upon the advice tendered to 
them by their Board" [quoted in Kitchen, 1979, p. 94]. This 
accepts the "necessity" of the shareholders' welfare being given 
overriding consideration in determining the greatest balance of 
good over evil [Edwards, 1979, p. 277]. 
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As far as creditors are concerned, both the Law Society and 
the Institute took the view [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 102 and p. 
120] that creditors' means of protection was largely in their own 
hands — they must pursue their own inquiries. Both submis-
sions asserted that creditors could obtain as much information 
about the financial position of a company as they could about 
that of an individual. Both concluded "It is impossible by legis-
lation to protect fools from their own folly" [Edwards, 1980, 
Vol. II, p. 102, and p. 120]. 
The Greene Committee appears to have accepted the view 
that additional disclosures should be kept to an absolute mini-
mum. The Committee argued that it would be "most undesir-
able, in order to defeat an occasional wrong doer, to impose 
restrictions which would seriously hamper the activities of hon-
est men and would inevitably re-act upon the commerce and 
prosperity of the country" [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 79]. The 
Committee appealed to the concept of utility. The system of 
limited liability leaves opportunity for abuse, but these costs are 
outweighed by the benefits to trade and industry. The report did 
include proposals for minimum disclosure in the balance sheet. 
The report also recommended that the balance sheet and the 
profit and loss account be presented to the members at each 
annual meeting, and the former document be circulated to the 
members prior to the meeting. It was further recommended that 
a copy of the last audited balance sheet be filed annually with 
the Registrar of Companies [Edwards, 1979, p. 281]. 
Companies Act of 1928 
The Companies Act followed the recommendations made by 
the Greene Committee in connection with accounting matters. 
It included requirements for companies to distinguish between 
the amounts of fixed assets and floating assets, to show bal-
ances for several named intangible assets and to provide a small 
amount of information concerning subsidiary companies. More-
over, the Act required, for the first time, that directors were 
responsible for circulating the accounts to members prior to the 
annual general meeting. Section 39(4) also called for a directors' 
report to be attached to the balance sheet. A "real advance" 
[Edey, 1979, p. 228] was the requirement to present a profit and 
loss account (which need not be audited) to those shareholders 
in attendance at the annual meeting. Sections 6(d) and 39(4) 
made it clear that only the balance sheet and the directors' re-
6
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port presented to the company at a general meeting need to be 
filed with the Registrar. This innovation illustrates a continuing 
"preoccupation with the shareholder group" [Edwards, 1980, 
Vol. I, p. xvi]. Presumably, the profit and loss account was not 
required to be filed with the Registrar because it was thought to 
give an unfair advantage to a competitor. 
In this period, disclosure is viewed as an intramural prob-
lem of the directors and the shareholders. To give shareholders 
greater rights to know would result in benefit to competitors. 
Moreover, enforced disclosure in the difficult economic condi-
tions facing directors in the 1920s may have precipitated the 
collapse of the company with consequent loss to the general 
public and the work force. It was not until 1931 that 
management's right to privacy was seriously challenged in the 
Royal Mail case. 
THE ROYAL MAIL CASE 
Edwards observes that in the months following the intro-
duction of the 1929 Act there was a general improvement in 
reporting practices particularly on the assets side of the balance 
sheet [1979, p. 284]. Nevertheless, profit manipulation and the 
maintenance of secret reserves persisted. Edwards states "it is 
fairly clear that where the Act placed some specific obligation 
on directors, this was complied with. Where no such obligation 
was imposed, information did not gratuitously emerge" [p. 285]. 
This aroused accountants and others to criticize the value 
of the audit function. The auditor had been required since the 
Act of 1900 to report on the truth and correctness of the ac-
counts. The most well known failure of the auditor to fulfill that 
duty occurred in the Royal Mail case [Brooks, 1933]. Briefly, 
Lord Kylsant, chairman of the shipping line, and the company's 
auditor, H. J. Morland, were accused of deliberately misleading 
shareholders as to the true state of the company's financial posi-
tion. The line had been doing badly since 1921; and from 1926, 
Kylsant, with the knowledge of the auditor, had been transfer-
ring large sums out of excess tax provisions and non-recurring 
items of revenue to help pay dividends. Neither the transfers 
from reserves nor the company's true trading losses were dis-
closed in the annual accounts. The only notice given to share-
holders that the profit had been derived from the utilization of 
secret reserves were the words "including adjustment of taxa-
tion reserves" inserted in the balance sheet by Morland. 
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Morland was acquitted on a charge of dishonesty because he 
had merely adopted a customary practice. It is interesting that 
the company had published information concerning profitabil-
ity in the early years of the century despite the absence of any 
company law requirements, but in common with those of other 
hard pressed firms, the accounts gradually revealed less and less 
[Edwards, 1979, p. 288]. It was this case, more than any other 
single event, that secured the shareholders' rights to a candid 
disclosure of profits. 
The correlative duty on management not to hide informa-
tion is implied in the special relationship which management 
has with its shareholders. Managers are the agents of the share-
holders and promise to represent the interests of the sharehold-
ers and to appraise them of their progress in this regard. This is 
a deontological justification for disclosure.7 Edwards reflects the 
shift that was taking place: "It is preferable to alarm one's share-
holders by frank disclosure of the financial position than to 
keep them in a fool's paradise until it is too late for a remedy to 
be possible" [Edwards, 1979, p. 290]. 
It is interesting that the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (ICAEW) continued to call for reform to 
be effected "through the influence of individual members and 
that there was no need for further legislation" [quoted by 
Kitchen and Parker, 1980, p. 77]. The Institute felt, on the one 
hand, that general pronouncements could easily be circum-
vented or misapplied, while on the other hand, detailed pro-
nouncements were impracticable because of the diversity of 
business situations. By contrast, the Society of Incorporated Ac-
countants argued that it was "unreasonable to expect the audi-
tor to progress beyond the minimum requirements laid down by 
the law; these were regarded as constituting an effective limit on 
his powers" [Edwards, 1979, p. 290]. 
It took another decade, however, before it was realized that 
an increase in moral goodwill was not sufficient to offer share-
holders protection of their rights. Zeff records that there was 
still much dissatisfaction in the late 1930s and early 1940s with 
accounting practices. It was following a series of articles pub-
lished in The Economist in 1942 concerning the inadequacies of 
7Deontologists "assert that there are . . . other considerations which make an 
action or rule right or obligatory besides the goodness or badness of its conse-
quences — certain features of the act itself other than the value it brings 
into existence . . . " [Frankena, 1963, p. 14]. 
8
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published accounts, that the ICAEW changed its attitude to one 
of issuing recommendations on best practice to members [Zeff, 
1972, p. 10]. 
UTMOST PUBLICITY 
An Expansion in Number of Accountees 
The early recommendations of the ICAEW formed the basis 
of the sweeping reforms in the accounting requirements which 
were recommended by the Cohen Committee on Company Law 
Amendment in a report published in 1945. The terms of refer-
ence given to the Committee included an obligation to review 
the "safeguards afforded for investors and for the public inter-
est" [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 128]. As Edwards observes, for-
mal recognition of the public interest indicates the extent to 
which official attitudes had changed during the time since the 
Greene Committee. This can be seen as a reflection of the 
changes in social attitudes stimulated by the war [Bircher, 
Spring 1988, p. 117]. 
In keeping with the call for social justice and a more equi-
table distribution of income and wealth, it was argued by repre-
sentatives of The Economist [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 181] and 
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 
212], which was making a submission to a Company Law 
Amendment Committee for the first time, that some standards 
for accounting information were necessary now that financial 
reports were serving a wider audience. 
The TUC appealed to the public interest or general utility in 
its submissions. It contended that the public's and workers' 
rights to know should outweigh any competitive disadvantage 
suffered by the company [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 207]. In 
response to the suggestion that publication of information 
about reserves would lead to a dog fight between management 
and the unions, the TUC representatives stated that it was not in 
their interests to raid the reserves if it was going to put the 
company on the rocks [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 208]. TUC 
representatives argued that dissemination of more information 
would improve confidence and understanding between labor 
and capital [p. 207]. 
The Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants 
drew the Committee's attention to the changed position of 
shareholders since the Greene Committee met. Instead of being 
a responsible proprietorship, shareholders were mere dividend 
9
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recipients, or investors seeking capital accretion. They argued 
that the controlling and functioning of companies now resided, 
in a vast majority of cases, with the directors and that there was 
a need to ensure that the directors (and shareholders) "shall not 
be able to conduct the business of a company as to secure for 
their interests a priority position as against the interests of oth-
ers" [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 192, see also Pollard, 1969, p. 
163 and Hannah, 1983, p. 27].8 
Several submissions pointed out that the phrase a "true and 
correct view" was becoming "distorted by secret reserves" 
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 181 (The Economist), p. 197, (de 
Paula)]. The Association of Certified Accountants, in their sub-
mission, set out in some detail a number of specified items 
which should be disclosed in order for accounts to exhibit a true 
and correct view [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 193]. The Associa-
tion also drew attention to the auditors' lack of independence. 
They noted that it is not infrequent for auditors, conceiving it 
their duty to draw attention to some particular feature in the 
accounts, to find themselves at variance with the directors and 
lose their appointment [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 193]. 
Cohen Committee 
Whereas "confidentiality" had been the watchword of the 
Greene Committee, "fullest practicable disclosure" was the ob-
jective identified by the Cohen Committee [Edwards, 1980, Vol. 
I. p. xvi]. This illustrates the change which had taken place in 
attitudes to disclosure. The Committee considered that utmost 
publicity would reduce the opportunities for abuse and accord 
with a wakening social consciousness [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 
130]. The report argued that the hands of the auditor would be 
strengthened if the law were to prescribe a minimum amount of 
information to be disclosed in all balance sheets and profit and 
loss accounts [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 131 and p. 137]. The 
Committee recommended that audits be conducted by fully 
qualified accountants. It suggested that auditors' independence 
be strengthened by disqualifying an employee of a company or 
an employee or partner of a director from being its auditor. As 
8This argument parallels those put forth by Berle and Means [1932] across 
the Atlantic, in which the authors suggest that the new concentrations of corpo-
rate power must now "serve not alone the owners or the control, but all society." 
[1967, p. 312]. 
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Willmott [1986, p. 560] points out "to maintain their position 
within the prevailing structure of power relations, the officers of 
professional bodies are obliged to gain the recognition and con-
fidence not only of clients but also, and crucially, of the state." 
Other recommendations included giving the auditors the right 
to attend all general meetings (not just those general meetings 
where accounts are discussed), and the right, if other auditors 
have been nominated, or if there is a proposal that they should 
not be reappointed, to put their views before the shareholders 
orally at the meeting and in writing prior to the meeting. 
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, pp. 148-150]. 
One final matter worth noting about the Cohen Report is 
that the Committee considered the profit and loss account "as 
important as, if not more important than, the balance sheet, 
since the trend of profits is the best indication of the prosperity 
of the company and the value of the assets depends largely on 
the maintenance of the business as a going concern" [Edwards, 
1980, Vol. II. p. 137]. In keeping with this, the Committee 
sought to bring the profit and loss account within the purview 
of the auditors' report. This no doubt accorded with the growing 
number of absentee owners wishing to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the company and to assess how much of the profit 
was available for distribution as dividends. 
Companies Act of 1947 
The Companies Act of 1947 was based largely on the exten-
sive recommendations of the Cohen Committee. It required au-
ditors to report whether the accounts were true and fair rather 
than true and correct. The replacement of the word correct by 
fair was at the suggestion of the English Institute [Edwards, 
1980, Vol. II, p. 167]. The Act prescribed specific disclosures 
which it regarded as the minimum necessary for the purpose of 
attaining a true and fair view. However, the Act made it clear 
that true and fair was an overriding requirement. This consider-
ably expanded the concept of minimum disclosure. 
The influence of the Royal Mail case on the legislation was 
obvious: among other things, the Act called for full disclosure of 
all reserves and movements therein, the reporting on the profit 
and loss account by the auditor, the adequate classification of 
accounts, the introduction of special requirements for holding 
companies, and the disclosure of further details in prospectuses. 
Other important extensions of the law were that both the bal-
11
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ance sheet and the profit and loss account had to be filed with 
the Register, and private companies no longer enjoyed immu-
nity from the obligation to file accounts. In addition, the auditor 
now had to be a member of a professional body. However, as 
Willmott [1986, p. 565] points out, the price exacted by the 
State for the sanctioning of market shelters for professional 
groups was the "reliable production and delivery of relevant and 
consistent knowledge and skill". 
It was now clear that no longer could the auditor rely on his 
own experience and strength of character in any contest with 
the directors. Statutory support was necessary to restore a mea-
sure of trust in the moral capacities of the accounters and to 
encourage an expansion rather than contraction of these capaci-
ties [cf. Niebuhr, 1932, p. 272]. The consequent impact on the 
quality of financial reporting "was little short of tremendous" 
[quoted in Zeff, 1972, p. 13]. "The justice which results from 
such a process may not belong in the category of morally cre-
ated social values, if morality be defined purely from the per-
spective of the individual. From the viewpoint of society itself it 
does represent a moral achievement" [Niebuhr, 1932, p. 31-32]. 
In sum, it took the Royal Mail case (1933) to bring about a 
greater recognition of shareholders' rights to know. With the 
divorce of ownership from control, managers had a moral duty 
(reflecting a deontological approach) to appraise shareholders 
of their progress. Also, it took the war and the awakening social 
consciousness that it brought to bring about a recognition of 
the public's rights to know. 
GREATER PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
Responsibilities to Investors and the Work Force 
The Report of the Company Law Committee under the 
Chairmanship of Lord Jenkins was presented to Parliament in 
June 1962. The range of interested parties giving oral evidence 
before the Committee had extended to include among others, 
The Society of Investment Analysts Limited, The Institute of 
Directors, The Institute of Actuaries, The Association of Unit 
Trust Managers, The British Overseas Banks Association, The 
Association of International Accountants Limited, The Faculty 
of Advocates, and accounting academics. 
The question of the competitive disadvantage of disclosure 
was once again discussed. Professor Baxter argued that the pub-
lic interest (general utility) should override the interests of 
12
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shareholders in this regard [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 294]. 
Baxter argued that "the more economic information there is the 
more prosperous we shall be." In his view, the only objection-
able thing "would be if for some reason Competitor A could 
limit the knowledge available to Competitors B and C; we are 
saying the thing should be published to the whole world" 
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 297].9 In his memorandum to the 
Committee, Baxter developed the case for full disclosure. 
In a free economy, resources are guided to their most 
fruitful uses (in the main) by the decisions of individu-
als. If the economy is to work efficiently, these deci-
sions must be based on adequate information. Inves-
tors should have available the fullest and clearest data 
on the working of the various sectors. Guided by such 
data, they will put new resources into sectors where 
likely returns are highest — thus helping to give the 
consumer what he wants, and to reduce abnormally 
high profit rates to the competitive level. The society 
that fails to provide itself with the best available infor-
mation is wasting resources, and keeping its income 
needlessly low .. . [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 298]. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Society of Invest-
ment Analysts [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 316 and p. 320]. This, 
of course, raises the "public good/free rider" problem. While 
investment analysts get information "free", others such as own-
ers, employees, or consumers must bear the costs of producing 
the information through smaller dividends, lower wages, or the 
payment of higher prices, respectively. 
The Trades Union Congress once more drew attention to 
the priority of the public's right to know over the shareholders. 
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 346]. The TUC posed the question for 
the committee: "What are the respective rights of the public and 
the companies?" It focused its remarks on the need for product 
line reporting arguing that they were disadvantaged in negotia-
tions by not knowing the profitability of particular products. 
9Professor Bell has argued recently that "if disclosure costs are negligible. . 
.but disclosure improves the long run efficiency in the economy overall, then a 
case can be made for mandating disclosure even where the entity making the 
disclosure seems to be hurt, competitively, in the process. The disclosing entity 
benefits from externalities when other entities disclose. And it will have ben-
efited from 'first use' of its cost cutting measure or measures." [1989, p. 61]. 
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The TUC lamented that the information useful to employees 
was really only a by-product of information published for share-
holders. It then argued for reports specifically pitched at em-
ployees to enable workers to form a view of the company. How-
ever, these reports did not eventuate until later in the nineteen 
seventies [see Burchell, Clubb, and Hopwood, 1985, p. 398]. 
Presumably, knowing that a company has a substantial profit 
on a particular product should also lead to new investment, 
perhaps by competitors in that product. 
Jenkins Committee 
The Jenkins Report repeated the views expressed by the 
Greene and Cohen Committees as to the undesirability of im-
posing restrictions which would seriously hamper the activities 
of honest men in order to defeat an occasional wrongdoer 
[Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 219]. In considering the trend toward 
additional disclosures, however, the Committee posed the ques-
tion of the value of the information to the persons receiving it, 
and whether its ascertainment would involve an amount of 
work disproportionate to its value or whether publication might 
be detrimental to the company's business, and thus indirectly 
detrimental to its shareholders and creditors [Edwards, 1980, 
Vol. II, p. 219]. 
The Committee argued for greater disclosure of information 
about subsidiaries, directors' compensation, and in the direc-
tors' report, information on the activities of the company in-
cluding the difference between the current market value of the 
fixed assets and their book values. In the balance sheet, the 
Committee recommended the following disclosures: the aggre-
gate amount of fixed assets acquired or disposed of or destroyed 
during the year, the basis of valuation of inventories, and the 
aggregate amount of the company's quoted and unquoted in-
vestments. Land was to be subdivided among freehold, long 
leasehold or short leasehold. Where fixed assets were shown at 
valuation — the name of the valuers, their qualifications and 
the basis of valuation. In the profit and loss account, turnover 
was to be disclosed and the method of calculation for the year 
stated. Income from quoted and unquoted investments was to 
be shown separately. 
The Committee also recommended the abolition of the ex-
empt private company in order to protect those who trade and 
extend credit to such companies [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 
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223]. The exempt private company had been introduced by the 
1947 Act to make available to the one owner or family-owned 
company the advantages of trading as an incorporated company 
without requiring from it the disclosure of information. 
Companies Act of 1967 
The Companies Act of 1967 made it mandatory for all com-
panies incorporated with the privilege of limited liability to file 
accounts with the Registrar, including an auditors' report and 
the directors' report. Thus, the new Act meant that businessmen 
formerly using the exempt private company had to decide be-
tween the value of maintaining the right of privacy as to their 
financial affairs, compared with the privilege of trading with 
limited liability. 
The Act accelerated the trend, evident in the earlier legisla-
tion examined, of greater public accountability. Nearly all the 
proposals of the Jenkins Committee relating to disclosure were 
implemented. Some provisions of the Act may be attributable to 
the case presented to the Jenkins Committee by the TUC for 
disclosure of information of interest to Unions and employees 
and also as a basis for public policy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the 1920s, disclosure was viewed as a matter of internal 
management to be determined by the articles and the decisions 
of the directors and members. This laissez faire attitude was 
underpinned by the belief that the greatest possible freedom 
should be allowed to those responsible for the management of 
companies. Professional bodies, making representations before 
the Greene Committee, felt that compulsory disclosure was not 
desirable, rather they appealed to the mechanism of sharehold-
ers' democracy at the annual meeting of the company. The En-
glish Institute took the view that it was "impossible by legisla-
tion to protect fools from their own folly". Two other factors 
appear to have been influential. First, secrecy would prevent 
any advantage accruing to competitors, and second, privacy 
may also enable the company to weather any temporary set-
back in the demand for its products. The cult of privacy could 
be justified on utilitarian grounds, which, as Garnsey notes, 
shareholders were quick to appreciate, assuming the "givens" of 
their viewpoint. 
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The Royal Mail case showed how management could use its 
control over information in annual accounts in a manner which 
can misrepresent company performance. The case established 
shareholders' right to candid disclosure of company perfor-
mance. The correlative duty on management not to conceal in-
formation is implied in the fiduciary relationship which man-
agement has with its shareholders. The emphasis on 
rights-based, deontological theories was given further impetus 
by the war. In particular, it was argued that a directorship 
should be a species of moral trusteeship, towards the British 
nation [quoted by Bircher, 1988, p. 117]. No longer was disclo-
sure an intramural affair of the directors and the members of 
the company. It was recognized that the law must protect the 
rights of outsiders and that some standards in the presentation 
of this information were necessary. As the TUC representatives 
contended before the Cohen Committee in 1944, workers are 
entitled to know the facts underlying the calculation of wages. 
Secrecy and secret reserves were contributing to suspicion and 
a lack of confidence. With the control of companies increasingly 
in the hands of professional managers, it was argued that the 
law should protect the investor, the outside creditor, and the 
general public. The English Institute, which had earlier opposed 
compulsory disclosure legislation, now strongly advocated it. 
This may be understood to have enabled them to extract from 
the government a license for the control of the supply of profes-
sional workers to the market. The Institute's recommendations 
became the basis of sweeping reforms put forward by the Cohen 
Committee and subsequently enacted in companies legislation 
in 1947. The legislation greatly strengthened the auditor's posi-
tion by prescribing a minimum of information to be disclosed 
in all balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. This in-
creased the credibility of financial reports. 
A further increase in the number of organizations and per-
sons concerned with accounting results is apparent from the list 
of those giving evidence before the Jenkins Committee in 1960-
1961. A leading academic, Professor W. T. Baxter, argued the 
case for disclosure on the grounds of its role in the efficient 
allocation of capital for investment. The TUC pressed its call for 
more equitable returns for labor based on a break down of 
profit figures for product lines. The TUC requested reports spe-
cifically tailored to enable workers to form a view of the com-
pany. These extensions of disclosure were justified in utilitarian 
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terms as information which would be in the interests of the 
public at large [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 336] accepting the 
necessities of the employee viewpoint. Some provisions of the 
Companies Act of 1967 can be attributed to these submissions, 
for example, s. 17 of the Act required the Directors' report to 
disclose the turnover and profitability of classes of business 
where these differ substantially from each other. 
These reforms have been the only sure means of inducing a 
true and fair view. However, shareholders have been the domi-
nant group whose interests were being served. It was not until 
1980 that the Companies Act laid an obligation on directors to 
consider the interests of employees "as well as the interests of 
its members." 
The relevance of this study to two contemporary problems 
will be considered briefly. The first is education. Successive 
Companies Acts have spelled out with increasing specificity the 
information necessary for attaining a true and fair view. The 
difficulty with this approach is that the disclosure laws came to 
be seen as autonomous from the morality of truth and fairness. 
Although Benson (later Lord) said in evidence before the 
Jenkins Committee in 1961 that true and fair has become "in-
grained in the profession" [Edwards, 1980, Vol. II, p. 366], val-
ues such as these must be actively protected from erosion 
[Demant, 1952, p. 115]. Today truth and fairness are regarded 
as problematic [Rutherford, 1985, Puxty et al., 1987, p. 285; 
Willmott, 1986, pp. 575-6]. As Frankena warned "principles 
without traits are impotent" [1963, p. 53], and "having a moral 
ideal is wanting to be a person of a certain sort, having certain 
traits of character rather than others" [p. 54]. Educators there-
fore need to rediscover the ethics of character or virtue, a type 
of ethics that places primacy on the formation of the moral self 
[Hauerwas, 1974]. 
The second issue is policy making. Both shareholders and 
employees have appealed to deontological and utilitarian theo-
ries. Each assumes that moral conflict can be resolved by a 
single fundamental principle. The assumption underlying the 
capitalist-utilitarian ideal, for instance, is that the common 
good equals the greatest sum of individual satisfaction. The 
policy formed on this basis must therefore be the result of a 
coalescence of self interest. Puxty et al. [1987, p. 275], highlight 
the hardiness of laissez faire ideology and the significance of the 
City of London as a world financial center in explaining the 
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regulation which emerged. The authors suggest that the market 
principle of dispersed competition through economic entrepre-
neurship and calculative rationality is predominant. 
The problem is that justice in utilitarian terms is conceived 
only as a procedural requirement. The demand of the common 
good is to seek, form and maintain a rational community (not 
just a harmonizing of interests) [Hauerwas, 1974, p. 237]. To 
formulate and envision such a good and make it efficacious for 
all accountees remains the challenge which faces policy makers 
and researchers alike [Willmott, 1986, p. 574]. 
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